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Democracy and Social Welfare in Uruguay And Paraguay  
 
Abstract: The aim of this article is to assess the ways democracy affects social welfare, 
by analyzing two Latin American countries: Uruguay and Paraguay, one with a vibrant 
democratic history and a progressive political landscape, the other with a generally 
authoritarian past and a conservative dominant party. We maintain that welfare systems 
in these countries have been critically shaped by the impact of democracy, or by its 
absence, and by the strategies adopted by major social and political actors, especially 
parties: these strategies have been determined in turn by parties’ ideologies and by the 
workings of electoral competition. We also underline that the impact of democracy on 
social welfare is critically mediated by the role of previous welfare legacies, the presence 
of welfare constituencies defending acquired rights and privileges and by social and 
economic variables, as overall wealth levels, the formal or informal nature of labor 
markets and the political organization of domestic economies.  
 
 
 
The aim of this article is to assess the ways democracy affects social welfare, by 
analyzing two Latin American countries: Uruguay and Paraguay, one with a vibrant 
democratic history and a progressive political landscape, the other with a generally 
authoritarian past and a conservative dominant party. We maintain that welfare systems 
in these countries have been critically shaped by the impact of democracy, or by its 
absence, and by the strategies adopted by major social and political actors, especially 
parties: these strategies have been determined in turn by parties’ ideologies and by the 
workings of electoral competition. We also underline that the impact of democracy on 
social welfare is critically mediated by the role of previous welfare legacies, the presence 
of welfare constituencies defending acquired rights and privileges and by social and 
economic variables, as overall wealth levels, the formal or informal nature of labor 
markets and the political organization of domestic economies. This paper is organized as 
follows: in the first section we revise the theoretical foundations of our argument. Then, 
we proceed to describe the economic and political determinants of welfare performance 
in both Uruguay and Paraguay. In the following part, we trace the process by which 
organized interests, promoting or opposing specific policies, participated in reforming 
their respective pension systems. As usual, conclusions wrap up the analysis.     
 
Theoretical review  
It is known that, since the first instances of democratization in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth century, the political inclusion of workers was accompanied by demands 
of economic redress: participation was seen as an instrument of economic redistribution 
and franchising was often subordinated to the moderation of economic and social 
demands. In spite of the required moderation, however, through political incorporation 
workers were able to promote their interests in a more effective manner, by winning the 
right to organize and make their voices heard (Lipset and Smelser 1966; Lindert, 2004; 
Carbone, 2009). Under democracy, the less advantaged had a better chance to organize 
and asked to redistribute income downwards.1 Politicians, in turn, had a greater incentive 
                                                 
1 Studies on developed capitalist democracies confirm this finding (for instance, Alderson and 
Nielsen, 2002; Bradley, Huber, Moller, Nielsen and Stephens, 2003). Outside the Western World, 
democracies seem to perform better than autocracies in health, education levels and levels of 
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to satisfy voters’ demands and expanded, at least in the long term, welfare entitlements 
and provisions, since they must appeal to broad constituencies to win elections and retain 
office. Such mechanisms are lacking in authoritarian regimes: especially where organized 
challenges are absent, social incorporation will not occur or will be minimal.2 Political 
regimes permitted the organization and social incorporation of certain groups, notably 
workers and peasants, or mandated their exclusion and repression: inclusion took place 
mostly under democracy, exclusion under authoritarianism. Although authoritarian 
governments may occasionally favor the less advantaged, as with the Velasco regime in 
Peru or with semi-authoritarian regimes in Brazil and Mexico, regional dictatorships were 
generally less inclined than democracies to extend coverage of social security to new 
sectors of the population.3  
In democratic regimes, the main bearers of political ideologies are political 
parties: they influence the emergence and evolution of welfare states through policy 
orientations. Ideologies refer to ideal worldviews and the instruments deemed necessary 
to accomplish them: in Latin America, as in more advanced industrial countries, parties 
may be classified based on a left/center-left versus right/center-right dichotomy. Left 
oriented policies are identified by the commitment to use state resources to promote 
social solidarity, reduce inequality and serve the underprivileged, as opposed to 
promoting growth, endorsing individualism and furthering the interests of the privileged 
(Coppedge, 1997; Huber, Nielsen, Pribble and Stephens, 2006: 949). While in the more 
advanced industrial countries large welfare states were promoted and consolidated by 
both left and right parties, the former endorsed policies that benefitted particularly lower 
income earners to a greater extent than did right leaning parties. Similar conclusions 
apply to recent developments in Latin America (Huber, Nielsen, Pribble and Stephens, 
2006). However, once democracy is established, more and better social services and a 
progressive welfare system usually follow only when a certain amount of time has 
elapsed and workers are able to organize and get represented, both at the political and 
social level. One crucial implication is that democratic tradition, rather than democracy 
itself, is likely to lower inequality, since time is necessary for political parties to emerge, 
                                                                                                                                                 
human development (Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi, 2000; Reuveny and Li, 2003; 
Siegle, Weinstein and Halperin, 2004). The literature, however, is far from conclusive: some 
argue that democracies display higher levels of social expenditures, but not always achieve better 
results than authoritarian regimes (for instance, Bollen and Jackman, 1985; Ross, 2006; Nelson, 
2007). Most scholars, finally, have focused on Western industrialized nations (Esping-Andersen, 
1990; Kitschelt, 1994; Hicks, 1999; Huber and Stephens, 2001). Only recently a few major works 
have centered on extending and adapting this literature to new geographic and historical contexts, 
such as Asia, Latin America and Africa (Gough and Wood, 2004; Haggard and Kaufman, 2008). 
2 Empirical findings show that, in developing countries, popular pressures are likely to put land 
reforms on the agenda of elected governments (McAuslan 1998: 527) and that wage increases are 
more easily achieved within the framework of democratic regimes (Rodrik 1999). Under 
authoritarian rule, by contrast, landowners or capitalists with a stake in the governing coalition 
would likely prevent the adoption of similar measures, as they did in Pinochet’s Chile, or in post-
1964 Brazil (Bollen and Jackman 1985: 439; Gradstein and Milanovic 2004:519). 
3 Under Velasco (1968-75), the welfare system was consolidated, but not expanded. In Brazil 
(1971-1985) and Mexico (1970-1982), semi-competitive political regimes somewhat extended 
social protection. However, in Brazil welfare policies were implemented mostly in order to 
prevent a revival of social unrest in the countryside and to fuel patronage politics in favor of the 
government-backed Arena party. In Mexico, social policies were even less resolute and 
intensified only as political challenges from competing parties became more acute. In both cases 
results were limited, well below those of sustained democracies, while social inequality remained 
enormous (Haggard and Kaufman, 2008: 16).  
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especially for those representing the underprivileged, as the underprivileged lack the 
power and money to influence decision makers directly (Huber and Stephens, 2001). 
Once democracy is established, ideological orientation crucially interacts with 
electoral competition. When election results are fiercely disputed, irrespective of 
ideological orientation, parties may be driven to undertake policies that they might 
otherwise disregard, for the exclusive purpose of winning elections. Thus, we posit that 
governments refrain from taking unpopular cutbacks, unless they think they are in a 
strong enough position to absorb the electoral costs such measures imply. Besides, if the 
main electoral challenge comes from the opposite ideological camp, policies may be 
undertaken to capture the independent voter at the center and will be more conservative, 
or progressive, than the purely ideological stance of each individual party would imply 
(Pribble, forthcoming).4 In Uruguay, for instance, the hotly contested 1989 presidential 
elections, along with wide welfare entitlements and strong public expectations, induced 
the conservative Blanco party to engage in the defense of the established welfare system, 
even if this run counter to neoliberal tenets of social reform (Haggard and Kaufamnn, 
2008: 360).  
Accordingly, left-wing and right-wing parties may become more similar: the 
former cannot pursue their preferred policy of welfare state expansion because of budget 
constraints; the latter cannot pursue their preferred policy of cutbacks because their 
constituency has grown attached to welfare state’s programs (Schumacher and Vis, 
2009). Left leaning parties had to reckon with both the fiscal crisis of the state and the 
need to reform inefficient and unjust social systems: the return to democracy had allowed 
powerful constituencies to protect more effectively their rights and benefits, against not 
only neoliberal reforms but also the redistributive demands of unorganized social sectors. 
In response, such parties frequently adopted miscellaneous policies, liberalizing to some 
extent existing social security schemes for fiscal reasons; compensating influential 
organized interests to satisfy traditional constituencies; and targeting antipoverty 
programs at the very poor to correct past injustices in the distribution of income. Right 
leaning parties, in turn, could not ignore the demands to safeguard broadly based welfare 
systems: electoral responsiveness requires that parties develop policies that maximize 
their chances to win elections, by appealing to broader constituencies. From this point of 
view, conservative parties also exhibited a pragmatic behavior based on political 
calculations rather than on a clear split with left-of-center parties, rooted on purely 
ideological grounds.5  
Competition, however, develops not only among parties, but also within parties. 
In Latin America, factions within parties have plaid a significant role in determining the 
                                                 
4 On occasions, political pacts have been struck by ideologically rival parties to support common 
policy positions, as with the rule of co-participation in Uruguay. This was an extremely important 
para-constitutional rule by which Blancos and Colorados divided state resources on a proportional 
basis. 
5 In Uruguay institutionalized parties proved highly permeable to organized groups and often 
negotiated with them, especially in the phase of policy implementation. This broad understanding 
minimized the impact of political and social oppositions and produced welfare reforms which 
found defenders across the political spectrum, ensuring varying degrees of protection for major 
economic and social interests. The existence of direct instruments of democracy, as referenda, 
was also consequential: organized groups close to the ISI model could count on autonomous 
channels and institutional mechanisms to submit demands, to mobilize, and to stimulate feedback 
effects on the party system. This allowed the formation of a powerful veto coalition, backed by 
the political left and by more conservative parties, but also able to operate and block undesired 
legislation on its own. 
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policy positions eventually supported by the party as a whole. Factions have been 
especially relevant in Uruguay, where intraparty competition has been the norm since the 
nineteenth century and factions have sometimes adopted different policy preferences 
(Altman 2000, Appendix). For instance, the Movimiento Nacional de Rocha during the 
Lacalle administration and the Foro Battlista within the Colorado party upheld policy 
options clearly opposed to those defended by their respective parties. The relevance of 
party factions may be magnified by particular institutional features: in Uruguay, for 
instance, an unusual voting system (double simultaneous voting) allowed voters to select 
their candidate from within party lists and legislature seats in turn were divided among 
competing lists. This arrangement stimulated candidates to develop their own bases of 
support within the party and amplified intraparty competition. 
Democracy and political parties, finally, crucially shape social policies in 
conjunction with other factors. In recent decades, economic downturns, the fiscal crises 
of the state and welfare legacies have caused a profound shift in social policies and 
facilitated reforms driven by an ideological trend that pushed for a weakening of the 
social responsibilities of the state. Meanwhile, a new wave of democratizations has 
created incentives to further expand welfare entitlements, while protecting existing social 
rights. Social well-being has also been shaped by the structure and political organization 
of the economy. In particular, the formal or informal nature of the labor markets, the 
nature of general development models and their sustainability over time have proved to 
be critical. In Uruguay, for instance, the Import Substitution model originated in the 
1930s was based largely on the same popular sectors on which the new welfare system 
rested, namely urban employees belonging to the formal segment of the economy. In this 
perspective, the welfare legacies of earlier redistributive coalitions are especially 
relevant, as established political and social constituencies strive to protect their 
traditionally acquired benefits against further redistribution and new actors, as the 
administrators of private pension funds, have entered the scene. In short, past policies 
have contributed to structure the problems to be solved and the opportunities to exploit. 
 
Economic and Political Determinants of Welfare performance 
 Uruguay and Paraguay are starkly different countries, both economically and 
politically. In the former, per capita income exceeded regional average by 42 per cent in 
1970 and by 68 per cent in 2008 (Cepal, 2008). During this period, the economic record 
was particularly vibrant: still, in the 1970s the country suffered the demise of its import 
substitution model, based on domestic industrialization, and it underwent a rapid growth 
of trade deficits. It was only years after democracy was re-established that the economy 
started again to expand and reached new heights, with the notable exception of the 
difficult years between 1998 and 2002. In Paraguay, during the same period, per capita 
income was 72.5 per cent below regional average in 1970, a figure that decreased slightly 
to 69 per cent in 2008 (Cepal, 2008). The return of democracy, on the other hand, did not 
coincide with renewed economic growth. Levels of per capita income increased during 
the 1970s, but have since remained more or less unchanged. Consequently, the economic 
downturn at the end of the 1990s was somewhat more contained (Figure 1). 
The formal or informal nature of labor markets is another key variable in shaping 
welfare policies and outcomes: if most of the economically active population is employed 
in the formal sector, an occupationally based pension scheme or health insurance that 
covers dependents can be very effective and provide ample coverage. However, if most 
workers are unemployed, self-employed or employed in the informal sector, that same 
scheme can be exclusionary and cover only privileged minorities. Differences in the two 
countries are evident in this respect, as well. In Uruguay, 34 per cent of the urban 
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population was informally employed in 1981 (Freije, 2003). This proportion increased to 
40 per cent in 2004, but subsided again to about 25 per cent in 2011 (INE, 2011). 
Informal workers comprised around 49 per cent of the urban employed in Paraguay in the 
early 1980s. Recent estimates reckon that around 70 per cent of rural workers and more 
than 60 per cent of the urban labor force work in the informal sector (BTI, 2012). 
Especially after the Great Depression and World War II, Latin American 
economies started to produce the manufactured goods that they had previously imported. 
Thus, domestic industry was heavily subsidized by the state and protected from external 
competition. In Uruguay, an Import Substitution model had originated in the 1930s, 
based on urban employees belonging to the formal segment of the economy. Social 
inclusion was stratified and unequal: in general, state and key sectors employees gained 
an earlier access and enjoyed more comprehensive benefits, while blue collar workers 
joined later and received less complete protection. On the contrary, rural workers and 
those employed in informal activities were excluded both from the new development 
project and from social security. Over time, the ISI model showed its limitations: the 
systematic transfers to loss-making public enterprises had negative fiscal implications, 
intensified by the weak tax base prevailing in the region. As a consequence, many 
politicians accepted a “neoliberal reform” agenda, which tightened the link between 
individual social contributions and benefits; expanded the role of private providers of 
welfare; improved oversight of public spending and policies; and targeted social outlays 
in favor of the most vulnerable. 
In Paraguay, Stroessner did not pursue a policy of import substitution 
industrialization and manufacturing was stagnant even between 1974 and 1981, a period 
of tremendous economic progress due to the construction of the Itaipú dam. In fact, 
agricultural modernization preceded urban modernization: expansion applied to modern 
agribusiness, agro-exports and public employment. Black markets, controlled by the 
military, were fuelled by contraband and replaced foreign trade. This distorted 
development model retarded social diversification, in spite of high rates of growth: even 
after the boom years Paraguay remained a rural country. Worker and peasant 
mobilization, and thus wages, were hold down by repression. The urban working class 
declined in size, as manufacturing decreased as a percentage of the economy, while the 
urban middle class grew slightly, but primarily from public employment and the tertiary 
sector. Finally, a rural business class was created, made up of loyal military and civilian 
bureaucrats rewarded by the regime with huge strips of land: from their ranks sprung a 
modern entrepreneurial class, which used state connections to invest in other sectors, 
creating complex interrelations between financial, farming, construction, industrial and 
transnational sectors. In sum, through “prebendalism”, the authoritarian regime awarded 
some social groups privileges and public jobs in exchange for loyalty, while even the 
most modern economic sectors were not well equipped, nor easily available, to lead ISI 
or other types of internal-based development. 
Political differences are equally glaring. Over the last century, Uruguay was 
among the freest Latin American countries and one of the first to democratize. The 
challenge to the agro-export oligarchies that had dominated regional politics since the 
1850s took place early on: the activation of democracy may be dated to the 1918 
Constitution, which introduced universal male suffrage and the secret ballot. Women 
were fully enfranchised in 1932. Between 1930 and 2010 democratic governments have 
ruled for over sixty years: military interludes, though brutal, are now seen as blips on the 
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longer trajectory of stable democratic governance.6 Paraguay, on the contrary, is still 
undergoing a difficult transition process. In 1989, a military coup overthrew General 
Alfredo Stroessner’s dictatorship: established in 1954, it was the most lasting Latin 
American dictatorship throughout the post-World War II period. The Stronato was 
supported by the military, and political power was handled through the hegemonic 
Colorado Party, that merged with the state. Under the false image of an ‘institutionalized 
democracy’, Stroessner used the party to exercise full power and eliminate political 
enemies. In 1992, a new Constitution adopted a democratic form of government, based 
on political pluralism and participation. The fragility of the emerging democratic 
institutions, however, is shown by almost twenty years of popular uprisings, military 
mutinies, antigovernment demonstrations, bitter political rivalries and unbroken Colorado 
rule. Information derived from comprehensive political data sets gives us a similar 
picture (table 1). 
In addition, Uruguay’s political history has been marked by the predominance of 
left-leaning political parties (table 2). The progressive Colorados exercised a virtual 
monopoly over the politics of democratic governments, while the 2004 and 2009 
Presidential elections were won by the left Frente Amplio coalition. The opposition 
Blanco party, representing a more conservative stance, won its first twentieth century 
election only in 1958. After the reintroduction of democracy it returned to power solely 
between 1990 and 1994.7 The Colorados, inspired by reformist President José Batlle y 
Ordoñez (1903-07 and 1911-16), dominated when the social security system was first 
established in the 1910s, and in the 1948-54 period when it was expanded and 
reorganized. The policies implemented by the Blanco government expressed the reaction 
of the countryside against the welfare model imposed, mostly in the urban setting, by the 
Colorados. Under Blanco rule, however, such model was not dismantled: rather it 
continued to grow and progress, but its costs were increasingly transferred to the 
industrial and urban sectors. This attitude reflects the existence of a broad political 
agreement between the two parties, the rule of co-participation. Especially since 1933, 
both applied a rule to public life by which every single aspect of the state was divided on 
a proportional basis. For example, after the return to democracy the Colorado Party 
almost always governed in alliance with a section of the National Party, which refrained 
from systematic opposition, thereby helping to ease the legislative passage of government 
policies. In short, although the Colorados have had more propensity to build a welfare 
state, both traditional parties may be credited with the evolution of the state apparatus 
during the twentieth century. In 2004, the Frente Amplio won the presidential elections 
and resumed a more marked left stance, especially defending state workers, professionals, 
urban service and manufacturing employees in the formal economy: thus, the health 
system was reformed (Sistema Nacional Integrado de Salud) and poverty levels were 
tackled trough specific plans, such as the Plan de Atención Nacional a la Emergencia 
Social (PANES) and the Plan de Equidad (PE). However, no major reforms were 
undertaken in the field of social security and pensions, mainly because of the veto power 
exercised by the economic interests within the current mixed system.  
                                                 
6 Democracy was interrupted twice by military interludes: first in 1933 (until 1942) and a second 
time in 1973 (until 1984). 
7 The latter originally rested on the support provided mostly by peasants living in the interior; the 
former represented for the most part urban Montevideo dwellers, among which lower and middle 
social sectors were prominent, and had liberal connotations. Political representation was not 
based explicitly on class cleavages, but rather on clientelistic and electoral ties between social 
groups and parties that favored a project of multi-class integration. 
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The parties that exercised the strongest influence in Paraguay’s political life are 
the Liberal and the Colorado. Born around 1887, they represented the European liberal 
ideals and nationalist principles, respectively. The Colorado, however, was the favorite 
instrument by which the military exercised their dictatorial rule, remaining 
uninterruptedly in power until August 2008. After the 1954 coup, the new government 
introduced a “predatory state” bent on ruthlessly exploiting the country’s wealth. Elites 
controlled the state and used its fiscal capacity to extract rents, without providing citizens 
with collective goods, as infrastructures, regulation or social services. Beside direct 
repression, control was exercised through affiliation to the hegemonic Colorado Party, 
which was organized down to the most minuscule village, giving it a threatening potential 
for political mobilization. Although operating within a new and more democratic political 
framework after 1992, it has not renounced its openly conservative outlook. The main 
opposition group, the Partido Liberal Radical Auténtico, a moderate centrist party 
affiliated to the Liberal International, was actively persecuted under the dictatorship. 
Reorganized in 1989, it won several local and administrative elections, but returned to 
power only in 2008, within a larger left-leaning coalition. In sum, the centrality of the 
Colorados and the conservative nature of power holders in society held back the chances 
to create a progressive political movement. The victory of Fernando Lugo at the 2008 
Presidential elections sparked new hopes that a “government of the people” was finally in 
place in one of the most conservative Latin American countries. The new government 
supported a series of social policies in favor of families in extreme poverty (Tekoporâ), 
child labour (Abrazo); students (Complemento Nutricional, Kits Escolares) and 
indigenous groups (Desarrollo Comunitario). However, no agrarian reform was passed 
and in spite of significant expenditures in social programs, poverty levels did not decline 
while income distribution actually worsened. Lugo’s removal from office (June 2012), by 
means of a dubious impeachment procedure,8 is a powerful reminder of how fragile the 
perspectives of genuine democratic consolidation, and of incipient social reform, 
continue to be in the post-authoritarian phase. 
Political and economic differences are reflected in social welfare policies and 
outcomes (Huber and Stephens, 2005). In Uruguay, in the 1970s, expenditures in 
education, as a proportion of GDP, were more than double; health outlays three times as 
high; and social security and welfare payments almost five times higher than in Paraguay. 
This gap further increased during the following decade. In 2010 Uruguay devoted almost 
12 per cent of its GDP to pensions and social assistance, while the corresponding figure 
was only 3.9 per cent in Paraguay (table 3). The difference is even more apparent if we 
consider absolute numbers: between 2008 and 2009, only $ 133 per capita were invested 
in public social expenditures in Paraguay, whereas this figure was over $ 1,434 in 
Uruguay, a more than tenfold ratio (Cepal, 2011, table A-12). Between 2006 and 2007, 
public social expenditure in Uruguay was more than 21 per cent of GDP, while in 
Paraguay it barely exceeded 9 per cent (Cepal, 2011, table A-13). 
From 1970 to 2010, Uruguay was one of the least unequal Latin American 
countries, and inequality declined over the period, whereas in Paraguay inequality 
remained high, with a Gini value that, in 2010, was standing at .53 (table 3). Only a 
handful of the countries in the region did worse than Paraguay: Brazil, Bolivia and some 
Central American countries. Likewise, levels of poverty were considerably lower in 
Uruguay. Although comparable data are difficult to acquire, according to the Economic 
                                                 
8 A number of Latin American governments declared that the proceeding was effectively a coup 
d'etat and Lugo himself, while formally accepting the impeachment, called it a "parliamentary 
coup". 
  8 
Commission of Latin America and the Caribbean, only 5.6 per cent of Uruguayan 
households lived below the poverty line in the 1990s, a figure which increased slightly to 
8 per cent in 2010. In Paraguay, during the same period, the corresponding values were 
above 49 and 54 per cent, respectively.9 What appears to be critical, from our perspective, 
is that inequality and poverty were much less severe in Uruguay, while per capita social 
expenditures, as well as social expenditures as a percentage of GDP, were to a large 
extent more prominent. 
Additional data on the actual allocation of social expenditure show a similar trend 
(tables 4 to 6). In Uruguay, the percentage of the population covered by health insurance 
swelled from 81 per cent in 1981 to over 95 per cent in 2000, and reached 97 per cent by 
2010. In Paraguay, on the other hand, only 18 per cent of the population enjoyed some 
form of health insurance in the mid-1990s and slightly over 23 per cent in 2010. In the 
former country, in 1980, over 95 per cent of the economically active population was 
covered by some form of social security. The ratio between pension contributors and the 
employed decreased slightly from 84.7 per cent in 1990 to 80.9 per cent in 2000. By 
2001, however, these figures were the highest in Latin America and stepped up again to 
almost 92 per cent in 2010. In Paraguay, in contrast, only between 18 and 19 per cent of 
the economically active population was covered by a pension scheme in 1995: this 
proportion went down to 14 per cent in 1998 and 12.7 per cent in 2008. In 2000, only 
22,550 people received retirement and/or invalidity pensions, while the corresponding 
number was over 400,000 in less populated Uruguay. In this country, finally, while 
primary education had already reached quasi-universal coverage early on, net secondary 
enrolment has shown a sensible progress, going from 68 per cent in 1991 to over 85 per 
cent in 2010. In Paraguay, however, while primary school enrolment was close to 
universal, in 2002 only 56 per cent of children of official school age attended the third 
cycle of primary education (covering students from 12 to 14 years old). Although during 
the 1990s secondary enrolment experienced a dramatic increase, it only covered 42 per 
cent of proper age students by 2008. 
Data on the redistributive impact of the latest democratic regimes, in both 
Uruguay and Paraguay, are consistent with these accounts (table 7). In Uruguay, the 
richest in society lost in favor of other social groups, but to a limited extent. 
Redistribution especially favored both the upper middle classes to which traditional 
parties had turned for political support and the lowest classes, which benefitted 
disproportionately from general and targeted social services. Blue collars and the middle 
class, represented politically by the Frente Amplio, were mostly able to defend the social 
rights and provisions to which they were traditionally entitled, but could not further 
advance their relatively privileged social status. In (urban) Paraguay, in the same period, 
redistribution was towards the top. The richest families significantly improved their 
share, while all other groups lost income: only slightly, the families immediately below 
them in rank; more severely, the ‘poorest’ 70 per cent of households, especially the 
bottom bracket. While in Uruguay a limited progressive redistribution did take place, no 
similar development occurred in Paraguay: during the period that followed 
democratization, the lack of previous democratic traditions and the predominance of a 
conservative party produced a further concentration of income in favor of the richest, a 
narrow social elite of businessmen, land owners and professionals with close ties with the 
ruling party and the military. 
 
                                                 
9 The 2010 figures for both countries refer to individuals, not to households, due to a change in 
data collecting introduced by Cepal in 2002. 
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Reforming the pension systems 
In this section, we will illustrate the specific processes of policy formation and 
implementation promoted by elected governments, in both Uruguay and Paraguay, to 
reform their pension systems. While both countries have recently undergone such reform, 
the extent and nature of their effort varied: restructuring was broader and deeper in the 
former, limited to the public sector and mainly devoted to ensure financial viability in the 
latter. Our purpose is to clarify the interaction of political and economic factors and 
decribe their impact on policy. Thus, we will discuss legislative battles, chart the 
organized interests promoting and opposing the reform, analyze their strategic 
interactions, explore the role of relevant policy legacies and economic arrangements, and 
evaluate the success or failure of remodeling.  
In Uruguay, Social Security was in financial disarray since the 1960s and the 
situation had worsened in the following thirty years. Beside demographic change, the 
increasing lack of resources was caused by generosity of access, mismatch between 
levels of contribution and levels of benefits, evasion and lack of adequate technical 
criteria for investment. As a result, with the return of democracy, a widespread perception 
of decline in benefits and in people’s welfare pushed ahead the issue of benefits 
indexation criteria (Filgueira and Moraes, 1999). In 1989, by way of a popular 
referendum which prompted a Constitutional amendment, pensioners demanded the 
indexing of pensions to the mean wage and adjustment timings linked to raises for state 
officials: the referendum was finally approved by almost 85 per cent of participants.  
The main actor of this policy battle was the Organización Nacional de 
Asociaciones de Jubilados y Pensionistas del Uruguay (ONAJPU): this social movement, 
consisting of 120 retiree associations, was able to forge a successful coalition with the 
trade union movement and part of the political opposition (Castiglioni, 2005). Uruguayan 
unions had traditionally cooperated with the state, capital and parties in coalitions 
supporting import-substitution, but maintained a substantial degree of autonomy. After 
the return of democracy, the unified and independent PIT-CNT labor confederation had 
firmly opposed privatization of pensions.10 Indexing was also supported by the Frente 
Amplio which formed, along with pensioners and unions, a powerful anti-privatization 
coalition (Kay, 1999). With the re-introduction of democracy, both the Colorado and 
Blanco parties had started to identify with the groups benefitted by the new export-
oriented model, as local employers and the transnational economic sector. Meanwhile, 
the Frente Amplio gained electoral strength, resuming political representation of old 
statist constituencies and the defense of the Battlista model. The policies of quasi 
universal welfare protection had strengthened the organizational capacity of certain social 
groups in the formal sector of the economy, in particular state constituencies: state 
workers, professionals, urban service and manufacturing workers. Such groups, backed 
by the Frente, were able to exercise a broad veto power against neoliberal reforms, 
facilitated also by instruments of direct democracy, as popular referenda, which allowed 
organized interests to submit directly to the political system claims in defense of the old 
welfare arrangement (Altman, 2011).11Politicians from the traditional parties, however, 
                                                 
10 Business organizations supported privatization, but did not take a prominent role in promoting 
reform. The Asociación Cristiana de Dirigentes de Empresa (ACDE) and the Consejo Superior 
Empresarial (CSE), for instance, formally endorsed the government plan after months of debate 
within the coalition government and only a few weeks before the law was finally approved  (Kay, 
1999: 411). 
11 Yet, these constituencies maintained their welfare status at the expenses not only of the 
wealthy, but also of the most vulnerable social sectors. In fact, the 1989 reform implied a drastic 
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fearing the loss of the pensioners, either backed the reform or did not take a position.12 
The existing welfare system enjoyed wide political support, not only among organized 
stake-holders, but also within the broader electorate: politicians bent on reforming the 
welfare system had to reckon with both (Luna, 2006).   
The 1989 amendment, however, placed increasing strains on state fiscal budgets 
and on the economy.13 In order to control soaring pension expenditures, Blanco leader 
Luis Alberto Lacalle (1990-95), introduced four successive reform proposals, tailored 
along market lines: all were eventually rejected by Congress. A fifth reform, supported 
by a far-reaching coalition of Blanco and Colorado officials, was discarded in another 
referendum called by pensioners. Restructuring was finally approved in 1995, during the 
second Sanguinetti administration (Colorado), after a broad agreement was reached 
among leaders of the two major parties and ONAJPU. As a result, the traditional public 
pensions system, managed by the state, gave way to a mixed system that integrated 
private companies and a complementary capitalization arrangement for the upper income 
sectors: informal sectors workers continued to be excluded from the system, while 
powerful groups, such as the military, maintained an especially privileged condition. 
Although these changes deeply transformed the old system, this remained statist and 
coherent with social goals abandoned by other regional governments.  
The key of the reform’s approval was political: while between 1985 and 1995 the 
party that won the elections governed mostly alone, in 1995 a full blown coalition 
between the two major parties was formed. In the former period, laws were passed on a 
case by case basis and groups from other parties supported the government in specific 
instances. Whereas cooperation between them existed, as mentioned, it referred more to 
opposition restrain than to collaborative reformism.14 In 1995, Congress votes controlled 
by the party in government had declined from 55 to 42 per cent, along with the seats 
controlled by the winning party fraction. In short, government by one party and one 
fraction became increasingly difficult.15 With the new three-party system, a paradox 
developed in favor of the left opposition: the latter vetoed reforms to the traditional 
system of social protection and pushed for increased funding. In doing so, it 
compromised macroeconomic stability, and parties in government were in turn forced to 
pass unpopular laws that made the electoral perspective of the left opposition even more 
favorable. To sum up, until 1995 the traditional party in the opposition preferred to blame 
the party in power for painful reforms of the system and refused to enmesh in stable 
coalitions, so that it could not be blamed for the costs of the reforms. However, with time 
it became clear that the major beneficiary of this interaction was the left opposition.  As a 
consequence, a new programmatic coalition was built between the two traditional parties: 
this time they preferred to pass broad reforms that would harvest benefits later rather than 
letting their political adversaries gain from their confrontation. In 1995, a multi-party 
                                                                                                                                                 
increase of financial means derived from regressive general tax revenues: such revenues climbed 
from 10.3 per cent of GDP in 1989 to 14.3 per cent in 1994. 
12 A notable exception was Colorado leader Jorge Battle, who advocated a reform Chilean style.  
13 Between 1984 and 1994, expenses going to social security as a percentage of GDP went up 
from 9.3 to 14.3 per cent (Filgueira and Moraes, 1999: 14).  
14 The inability to discipline members of sub-lists within each party, as illustrated above, severely 
hindered the chances to build an alliance between traditional parties (González, 1993).       
15 Between 1985 and 1995, the votes of the traditional parties declined while the left opposition 
gained weight. In 1985, the Colorado party received over 42 per cent of the vote, but only 32 per 
cent ten years later; in the same period, the Blancos went down from 35 to 31 per cent. 
Meanwhile the left wing coalition increased its votes from 24 to almost 31 per cent (Buquet, 
1995). 
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commission started to work on pensions’ reform: when an early consensus was reached, 
the bill was presented to Congress and approved with minor changes with the votes of the 
Colorado and Blanco parties. Only the left coalition voted against.  
The implementation phase implied controlling a possible reaction in the form of a 
plebiscite or referendum to repeal the law. To avoid this risk, the old system remained 
unchanged for retired persons and persons close to retirement (Filgueira and Moraes, 
1999: 19). When a referendum was actually called, the electoral Court decided that such 
request was unconstitutional, since the executive had a legal monopoly over social 
security initiatives. A second critical factor explains the successful implementation of the 
reform: the creation of new stake holders. Both the administrators of private funds 
Administradoras de Fondos de Ahorro y Previsión (AFAP) and their members have a 
stake in supporting the new system. By September 2008, 822,663 people were integrated 
into the capitalization funds, representing more than 24 per cent of the population, 50 
percent of the labor force and 60 percent of the employed. Furthermore, the AFAP 
managed approximately $ 3,600 million, which accounted roughly for 11 per cent of 
GDP.16 One of the reasons of this success is already evident in the late 1990s: by 1999, 
45 per cent of left wing voters were affiliated to an AFAP (actually a higher percentage 
than other parties). The most important veto player at the political level had half its 
constituencies as stake holders in the new system (Garmendia, 2010). Thus, even when 
the Frente Amplio rose to power in 2005, it did not fundamentally challenge the reformed 
system, which it had previously resisted.17    
The problem of pensions was crucial in Paraguay, as well. The Gonzáles Macchi 
administration (1998-2003) had left the country in a nearly bankrupt condition and unable 
to meet payments on certain of its obligations. The accumulated deficit of the pensions 
system over the previous six years was about $ 52 million and, in 2003 alone, it 
amounted to $ 15 million (Rodríguez Silvero, 2003). The Duarte government (2003-
2008) strived to reach a pact with the IMF and the World Bank: new credits were made 
available in exchange for a series of reforms aimed at rationalizing spending and 
containing the deficit. The reform of public sector pensions (administered by the Caja 
Fiscal) 18 was one of the measures agreed on: in particular, the new president proposed 
that, in order to retire, teachers substantially increase the years of service requirement, 
from 25 to 40, and raise their salary contributions from 14 to 16 per cent. 
The reform jeopardized one of the key supporters of the patronage system 
developed by the ruling Colorado Party: pensions benefits were part of the rewards to 
state employees, who were required until 1989 to be members of  the party, and teachers 
were a key component of this sector. The proposal caused a massive mobilization: on 
November 6th, over 20.000 teachers demonstrated in the streets of Asunción chanting 
                                                 
16 Opinion polls confirm the popularity and acceptance of the new system: in 1997, 28 per cent of 
those surveyed believed that the new system was good for them and the population, against 27 
per cent that believed it was bad. Within those that were actually affiliated to the capitalization 
funds, 50 per cent declared conformity with the new system (El País, 1997).  
17 This cautious approach has been motivated also by a lack of consensus within the left on the 
reforms to be adopted, especially whether the individual capitalization pillar should be eliminated 
or not; by the presence of private agents (the AFAPS) supporting the maintenance of the new 
system; and by the additional considerable costs deriving from its further reorganization 
(Midaglia, 2009: 145-46).  
18 The Caja Fiscal managed old age and seniority pensions, along with invalidity pensions, 
survival pensions and occupational injury insurance for public sector employees. Only 12.5 per 
cent of the active labor force was covered by state pensions, including public sector employees, 
police and the military. 
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slogans against Duarte and his new plan, nicknamed “grandmother project”, a reference 
to the older age they would have to reach to enjoy retirement. A strike followed in the 
next two weeks, with participation rates exceeding 90 per cent. Eventually an agreement 
was achieved by the two parties, with teachers accepting 28 years of service for 
retirement and a 16 per cent wage contribution. The results achieved by schoolteachers 
constituted a clear although incomplete victory, since they were able to demonstrate their 
ability to resist and negotiate (Turner, 2004). 
Duarte’s ambiguous stance towards teachers may be understood by looking at the 
dynamics of “predatory states”, such as Paraguay. In “predatory states” political access is 
restricted, so that power is used to limit economic competition and generate rents that 
benefit small minorities. When confronted with a contraction of rent based assets, the 
“predatory state” must find alternative resources or face a challenge to its rule (Richards, 
2008). Thus, in order to receive what had become a vital financial support by the IMF, 
Duarte had to commit himself to restructuring the pension system, but he avoided hurting 
the most powerful party constituencies and softened the social costs imposed by the 
reform. In fact, the most traditional base of Colorado support (the Police and the Army) 
continued to enjoy a particularly privileged status: while University professors and public 
officers were required 30 and 40 years of contributions to retire, members of the Police 
and the Armed Forces only needed 10 and 15 years, respectively. In addition, the new 
government drastically reduced the sacrifices initially demanded to teachers and the new 
discipline was applied only to those who entered the system after 1984, therefore 
safeguarding teachers who had already matured 20 years of service by 2003. Finally, the 
new president selectively enforced additional reform policies supported by the 
international lending institutions: while a campaign against corruption was effective in 
the cleaning up of customs, it did not translate into more severity against powerful but 
dishonest allies in the state oil distribution monopoly.19  
The reform of public pensions was backed by the IMF and by technical members 
of the cabinet, among whom Dionisio Borda, a respected economist in charge of the 
Finance Ministry. Business and agrarian interests were also in favor: their representation 
rested mainly with small economic elites in industry and agriculture, which controlled the 
flow of demands to policy makers in government.20 However, in 2005 the resignation of 
Minister Borda, who took special pride in fighting institutionalized corruption, was 
interpreted as a clear sign of the president’s progressive subordination to the institutional 
and individual interests of the Colorado party, at the expense of his self-proclaimed 
reformist vocation. Reforming was opposed, on the other hand, by a number of social 
organizations, mostly public sector unions. These, however, were especially weak and 
fragmented: on the whole, seven union federations coordinated less than 5 per cent of the 
labor force (Bogado, Carosini and Barrios, 2006: 174-75). In addition, president Duarte 
rejected negotiations with the groups resisting the new arrangement and refused to 
consolidate them into large social and political blocs that might facilitate engaging in 
                                                 
19 During his mandate, Duarte submitted a series of key reform projects, the most controversial of 
which were the reform of the pensions system, the 2004 budget and the tax reform bill. 
20 More generally, the inadequacy in health, public housing, and education policies reflect not 
only the lack of clout and representation of civil society, but also the power of vested interests in 
the Colorado Party and its continued alliance with the military and conservative economic elites. 
Public deficits to finance the least advantaged are perceived by these groups as jeopardizing rents 
to be distributed among political allies (Sondrol, 2007: 58). 
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shared policy-making.21 Instead, he chose to criminalize the protest, using all forms of 
judicial and police repression and mandated that the exclusive partners of government in 
policy concertation should be political parties (Lachi, 2004). In turn, the traditional elitist 
character of parties, as well as the elite incapacity to forge links with masses increasingly 
alienated with democracy, discouraged the introduction of deeper and more durable 
social changes. 
The strategy eventually adopted to secure the reform was to negotiate with parties 
with Congressional representation, thus limiting lobbying by the organizations opposing 
change. At least initially, public opinion backed Duarte who inserted his reforms in a 
broader discourse on improving state efficiency and fighting corruption.22 Critically, the 
President’s legitimacy and general popularity in public opinion polls strengthened his 
ability to maintain discipline within the Colorado party in Congress and improved the 
credibility of these accords for the opposition. In fact, Congress approved quickly the 
reform with only minor adjustments (Turner, 2004: 27-8). 
The weakness and limits of the 2003 reform are shown by an analysis of its 
aftermath. The reform was aimed mainly to secure financial viability: even this 
circumscribed goal, however, was threatened by later developments. At least seven new 
laws, approved by Parliament, have modified and watered down its original 
formulation.23 In a country where only few want to pay their taxes, but all want to take 
advantage of state assistance, these changes jeopardize not only the pension system of 
public employees, but also public finances. In 2011, the deficit of the Caja Fiscal has 
reached $ 202.9 million, 43 per cent of which corresponds to the difference between 
contributions and disbursements. In 2012, this figure will further grow to $ 316 million 
(Ministerio de Hacienda, 2012). Accordingly, both international and domestic observers 
have expressed renewed doubts on the financial viability of the public pension system 
(Ultima Hora, October 2nd 2011; and November 13th 2012). 
 
Concluding Remarks 
This study points to the existence of a positive relationship between democracy 
and social welfare. While the ability to reach progressive welfare outcomes is not 
guaranteed by a democratic polity, such outcomes are more likely under democracy than 
under authoritarian governments or under regimes that restrain political and economic 
participation. In the absence of competitive checks and mechanisms, politicians have few 
motivations to support egalitarian social bargains and are more inclined to redirect social 
resources to personal or private goals, thus upholding or increasing political and social 
inequality. Especially where democratic institutions have become established, 
progressive political parties emerged over time and pushed for more equitable income 
redistribution, as in the political experience of Uruguay in the first part of the twentieth 
century. Later on, the role of parties became more ambiguous: social policy choices were 
less directly related to ideological differences and critically influenced by electoral 
                                                 
21 At the beginning of the new century civil society was still very weak. The number of people 
actively involved in national politics and public policy in a poor, small nation of six million like 
Paraguay numbered no more than a few thousand (Sondrol, 2007).  
22 Duarte had presented himself as an independent politician, a champion of sound finances and 
an enemy of corruption: actually he was the first President to win internal Colorado elections 
without ties with Stronist circles, either “military” or “entrepreneurial” (De Riz, 2007). However, 
he rapidly shifted back to a familiar pattern in Paraguayan politics, based on securing firm control 
of internal party competition and maintaining a power system centered mainly on patronage. 
23 For instance, the bill submitted by Member of Parliament Fabiola Oviedo (UNACE-Capital) 
endorsed shortening the time period required by teachers to retire (Ley N° 3.613/09). 
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competition, economic and financial restraints, as well as legacies of previous welfare 
models. Democracy allows vested interests to organize and press politicians for favorable 
policy decisions, directly or through the electoral connection. As a consequence, if 
welfare entitlements and provisions were widely disseminated in society, conservative 
parties resisted fully implementing neoliberal reforms and adopted welfare policies that 
upheld established social rights. Conversely, in the last decades left parties confronted 
social constituencies that struggled for a defense of the existing system, against the 
interests not only of privileged upper classes, but also of marginal social groups. 
Consequently, they put into practice miscellaneous welfare measures, including some 
recommended by neoliberal economists.  
The circumstances of pension reform in Uruguay and Paraguay confirm that the 
impact of democracy on social welfare is tightly intertwined with crucial political 
realignments; political institutions as electoral rules or instruments of direct democracy; 
the structure and performance of the economy; and the emergence of domestic 
constituencies, shaped by these policies, which may exercise a veto power over additional 
policy changes. Thus, in Uruguay, organized pensioners fought both against privatization 
of the public pension system and further redistribution to the poorest while, in Paraguay, 
business and rural interests vetoed a more generous redistributive welfare, whereas 
teachers’ unions were able to water down the partial reform promoted by president 
Duarte. In short, an understanding of the surprisingly different versions of the welfare 
policies adopted by the two countries demands an analysis of democratic politics, 
political interests and rules, economic circumstances, and development strategies, along 
with a careful evaluation of their redistributive implications.   
 
Table 1. Political Performance in Latin America 
MBPL  
(1945-2007) 
Polity IV  
(1945-2010) 
 
Costa Rica 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Chile  
Brazil  
Colombia 
Ecuador 
Argentina  
Dominican Rep.  
Bolivia 
Peru 
Panama  
El Salvador 
Honduras 
Guatemala 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 
Paraguay 
1 
0.8 
0.8 
0.7 
0.6 
0.6 
0.6 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.4 
0.3 
0.3 
0.2 
0.2 
0.2 
0.2 
0.1 
Costa Rica 
Venezuela 
Colombia 
Uruguay 
Ecuador 
Chile  
Brazil  
Peru 
Honduras 
Guatemala 
Panama  
El Salvador 
Bolivia 
Dominican Rep. 
Argentina  
Mexico 
Nicaragua 
Paraguay 
10 
5.5 
5.5 
4.3 
3.4 
2.5 
2.1 
1.5 
1.5 
0.6 
0.6 
0.4 
0.3 
0 
-0.8 
-2.6 
-3 
-4.1 
Source: Polity IV, Data set, see http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/; Mainwaring, S. and 
D. Brinks. (2008) “Political Regimes in Latin America, 1900-2007.” Unpublished 
manuscript at: ttp://www.nd.edu/~smainwar/Political_Regimes.pdf. 
. 
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Table 2. Presidents of Paraguay and Uruguay 
 
 
 
 
 
Presidents of Paraguay Took office Party 
Alfredo Stroessner 
Andrés Rodríguez    
Juan Carlos Wasmosy  
Raúl Cubas Grau    
Luis Ángel González 
Macchi  
Nicanor Duarte    
Fernando Lugo  
 
15 August 1954 
3 February 1989 
15 August 1993 
15 August 1998 
28 March 1999 
 
15 August 2003 
15 August 2008 
Colorado 
Colorado 
Colorado 
Colorado 
Colorado 
 
Colorado 
Patriotic Alliance 
for Change 
Presidents of Uruguay Took office Party 
Juan Bordaberry 
Arocena;    
Alberto Demicheli 
Lizaso; Aparicio 
Méndez Manfredini; 
Gregorio Álvarez 
Armelino 
Julio Sanguinetti 
Coirolo    
Luis Lacalle de Herrera 
Julio Sanguinetti 
Coirolo (second term)  
Jorge Batlle Ibáñez  
Tabaré Vázquez 
José Mujica Cordano 
 1 March 1972 
 
12 July 1972 
 
 
 
 
1 March 1985 
1 March 1990 
1 March 1995 
 
1 March 2000 
1 March 2005 
1 March 2010 
Colorado 
 
Colorado, 
National and 
Military 
 
 
 
Colorado 
National 
Colorado 
 
Colorado 
Broad Front 
Broad Front 
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Table 3. Social Performance in Uruguay and Paraguay 
 
 
Source (1970-2001):  Evelyne Huber, John D. Stephens, Thomas Mustillo and Jennifer 
Pribble, Latin America and the Caribbean Political Dataset, 1945-2001, University of N. 
Carolina, 2008;  
Source (2010): Cepal, Panorama Social de América Latina, 2011. 
* Data refer to individuals not households. 
 
 
  Uruguay Paraguay 
 1970-
80 
1981-
90 
1991-
2001 
2010 1970-
80 
1981-
90 
1991-
2001 
2010 
Percentage 
Households below 
Eclac Poverty Line 
14.5 13.2 5.6 8.4* na na 49.5 54.8* 
Estimated Gini 47.4 43.4 43.2 43 na na 56.2 53 
Education 
expenditures as a 
percentage of GDP 
2.1 2.5 2.3 4.7 1 0.9 2.8 4.7 
Health expenditures 
as a percentage of 
GDP 
0.9 2.2 2.7 4.7 0.3 0.4 0.9 2.3 
Social Security and 
Welfare expenditures 
as a percentage of 
GDP 
10.8 12.8 17.8 11.3 1.9 2.4 2.1 3.9 
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Table 4. Health Coverage  (% Total Population) 
 Paraguay Uruguay 
1980 18 69 
1991  93.2 
1996  88 
1997 18.1  
1998   
1999 19.1  
2000 18 95.6 
2001 18.1  
2002 18.5  
2003 18  
2004 18.2  
2005 21.6 97.2 
2006  96.2 
2007 21.6 97.9 
2008  98.1 
2009 23.7 96.7 
2010 23.4 97.2 
Source: Paraguay: 1- Dirección General de Estadística, Encuestas y Censos: Censo 2002 
y Encuesta Permanente de Hogares, Cuadros: Tienen seguro médico (Asunción: DGEEC, 
various years). 
Uruguay: Uruguay: 1- 1980: Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Aspectos económicos-financieros de 
la seguridad social en América Latina y Caribe. II Congreso Interamericano jurídico de la 
seguridad social, Montevideo (1990); 2- 1990-2002: Natalia Ferreira-Coimbra, Alvaro 
Forteza Protección social en Uruguay. Financiamiento, cobertura y desempeño, 1990-
2002, Cuadro 43: Tienen cobertura de salud. (Santiago de Chile: OIT, 2004); 3- 2007: 
Fanny Trylesinski, Encuesta Nacional de Hogares Ampliada. Informe temático: Los 
uruguayos y la salud. (Montevideo: INE, 2007); 4- 2008-2010: Uruguay en cifras. Salud 
(Montevideo: INE, various years). 
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Table 5. Pension Coverage 
 PARAGUAY 
Covered by pension 
% EAP 
URUGUAY 
Covered by pension 
(contributors/employed) 
URUGUAY 
Covered by pension 
(contributors/EAP) 
1980   81 
1990  84.7 77.6 
1991  85.0 77.4 
1992  84.6 77.0 
1993  88.6 81.2 
1994  87.5 79.4 
1995 18-19 86.1 77.3 
1996  84.4 74.3 
1997  85.3 75.6 
1998 14 81.0 72.8 
1999 13.2 82.2 72.9 
2000  80.9 69.9 
2001 13 78.3 66.3 
2002 12.5 82.4 77 
2003 12.5 94.4 78.5 
2004  92.3 81.1 
2005  94.5 89.1 
2006  85.2 75.9 
2007  88.5 80.4 
2008 12.7 90.1 83.9 
2009    
2010  91.7 85.5 
Sources: Paraguay: 1- 1995-2001. Dirección General de Estadística, Encuestas y Censos, 
Encuesta Integrada de Hogares, 2000/01 (Asunción: DGEEC, 2001); Dirección General 
de Estadística, Encuestas y Censos, Boletino TAEC, 9, 12/2001(Asunción: DGEEC, 
2001) ; 2- 2002-2008: Dirección General de Estadística, Encuestas y Censos, Encuesta 
Permanente de Hogares (Asunción: DGEEC, various years).  
Uruguay: 1- 1980: Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Aspectos económicos-financieros de la 
seguridad social en América Latina y Caribe. II Congreso Interamericano jurídico de la 
seguridad social, Montevideo (1990); 2- 1990-2001: Natalia Ferreira-Coimbra, Alvaro 
Forteza, Protección social en Uruguay. Financiamiento, cobertura y desempeño, 1990-
2002, Cuadro 65: cobertura del programa de invalidez, vejez y sobrevivencia, (Santiago 
de Chile: OIT, 2004); 3- 2002-2010: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Uruguay en cifras, 
cuadros: cotizantes al sistema de seguridad social (Montevideo: INE, various years). 
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Table 6. School Enrolment 
 PARAGUAY URUGUAY 
 Primary school 
(age 6-11) 
Net % 
Secondary school 
(age 15-17) 
Net % 
Primary school 
(Age 6-11) 
Net % 
Secondary school 
(age 12-17) 
Net % 
1990 93 15   
1991 95 13 94.9 68.6 
1992 95 17 94.5 68.4 
1993 94 19 95.3 68.3 
1994 92 20 95.1 66.1 
1995 91 22 95.2 67.5 
1996 91 24 95.5 68.5 
1997 91 27 94.9 68.7 
1998 90 28 95.2 67.6 
1999 90 30 95 70.2 
2000 90 31 94.8 70.6 
2001 90 33 95.5 73.6 
2002 92 
 
39 94.7 75.5 
2003     
2004 93.1 (gross) 
age 6-14 
   
2005 92 (gross) 
age 6-14 
 96.5  
2006  39 99.6 85.1 
2007 94.3 (gross) 
age 6-14 
  84.4 
2008  42  84.7 
2009    86.2 
2010    85.3 
Sources: Paraguay: 1- 1990-2001: Ministerio de Educación y Cultura, Análisis 
cuantitativo de la evolución educativa, 1990-2001 (Asunción: MEC, 2003); 2- 
2002.2007: Dirección General de Estadística, Encuestas y Censos, Resultados Finales. 
Encuesta Permanente de Hogares (Asunción: GDEEC, various years). 
Uruguay: 1- 1990-2002: Administración Nacional de Educación Pública, Panorama de la 
Educación en el Uruguay. Una década de transformaciones. 1992-2004 (Montevideo: 
ANEP, 2005); 2- 2005-2006: Rubén Katzman and Francisco Rodriguez, Encuesta 
Nacional de Hogares Ampliada. Informe temático: Situación de la educación en Uruguay, 
(Montevideo: INE, 2006); 2007-2010: Encuesta Nacional de Hogares. Principales 
Resultados (Montevideo: INE, various years). 
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Table 7 .Changes in the Distribution of Household Income. 
Uruguay and Paraguay (1990-2005) 
 Poorest 40 
per cent 
30 per cent following 
the poorest 40 per 
cent 
20 per cent preceding 
the richest 10 per cent 
Richest 10 
per cent 
Uruguay 
(Urban) 
+1.5 +0.4 + 1.5 -3.4 
Paraguay 
(Urban) 
-3.6 -1.8 -0.4 +5.8 
Source: Cepal, Panorama social de América Latina, Cuadro 1.7 (Santiago de Chile: ONU, 
2006). 
 
FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 1. 
 
Source: Eclac, Statistical Yearbook of Latin America (various years). 
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